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Abstract
Deliberation among individuals online plays a key role in shaping the opinions that drive votes,
purchases, donations and other critical offline behavior. Yet, the determinants of opinion-change via
persuasion in deliberation online remain largely unexplored. Our research examines the persuasive
power of ethos – an individual’s “reputation” – using a 7-year panel of over a million debates from
an argumentation platform containing explicit indicators of successful persuasion. We identify
the causal effect of reputation on persuasion by constructing an instrument for reputation from
a measure of past debate competition, and by controlling for unstructured argument text using
neural models of language in the double machine-learning framework. We find that an individual’s
reputation significantly impacts their persuasion rate above and beyond the validity, strength and
presentation of their arguments. In our setting, we find that having 10 additional reputation points
causes a 31% increase in the probability of successful persuasion over the platform average. We
also find that the impact of reputation is moderated by characteristics of the argument content, in a
manner consistent with a theoretical model that attributes the persuasive power of reputation to
heuristic information-processing under cognitive overload. We discuss managerial implications for
platforms that facilitate deliberative decision-making for public and private organizations online.
Keywords: Persuasion, reputation systems, double machine-learning, causal inference from text
Preliminary draft, comments are welcome.
ar
X
iv
:2
00
6.
00
70
7v
1 
 [e
co
n.E
M
]  
1 J
un
 20
20
1 Introduction
Deliberation — “an extended conversation among two or more people in order to come to a better
understanding of some issue” (Nick Beauchamp, 2020) – forms the grease of societal decision-making
machinery, lubricating consensus among participants via fair and informed debate. The process of
opinion exchange in deliberation alleviates polarization, minority under-representation and several
other drawbacks of consensus formation arising from non-deliberative processes (such as in majority-
voting without discussion) by educating potentially uninformed participants and broadening their
awareness of alternative perspectives (List et al., 2013; Thompson, 2008).
An increasing amount of deliberation takes place online (Davies and Gangadharan, 2009), both
on social media and on specialized platforms developed for participatory democracy1, knowledge
curation2 and software planning3, among others. While going virtual broadens participation, the
increased visibility of “reputation” indicators online could distort the equitability of the deliberation
process. For example, (Marlow et al., 2013) find that project managers on Github (used for open-source
software development by Google, Facebook and Microsoft, among several other technology firms) use
visible reputation indicators when evaluating users’ feature requests and critiquing developers’ code
contributions. At the same time, this creates opportunities for firms to exploit reputation indicators
when directly interacting with consumers online to promote sales and mitigate churn (as gaming
giant Electronic Arts does on Reddit, for example). These opportunities also extend to philanthropic
organizations engaged in curbing the spread of misinformation online.
Whether reputation indeed has persuasive power in online deliberation is thus an important
concern, but one that is difficult to quantify due to the difficulty of recognizing opinion-change and
persuasion even on the rare occasions when it does occur. We overcome this challenge by assembling
a dataset of deliberation from the ChangeMyView4 online argumentation platform, containing over a
million debates spanning 7 years from 2013 to 2019. Strict curation by a team of over 20 moderators
ensures that debates on ChangeMyView are well-informed, balanced and civil, thus satisfying the key
tenets of authentic deliberation (Fishkin and Luskin, 2005). The debates in our dataset cover a variety
of topics, from politics and religion to comparisons of products and brands, reflecting the diverse
interests of over 800,000 ChangeMyView users. ChangeMyView users initiate debates by sharing
opinions, engage in dyadic deliberation with other users that challenge their opinion, and (uniquely)
provide explicit indicators of successful persuasion for each challenger that persuaded them to change
their opinion. For every user persuaded, challengers earn reputation points that are prominently
displayed with their username on the platform. The screenshot in Figure 1 illustrates the deliberation
process and the nature of reputation indicators on ChangeMyView.
1For example, see the Stanford Online Deliberation Platform: https://stanforddeliberate.org/
2For example, see Wikipedia Talk pages used to discuss Wikipedia edits: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Help:Talk_pages
3For example, see Github Issues used to plan open-source projects: https://guides.github.com/features/issues/
4http://reddit.com/r/changemyview/
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Figure 1: A debate. An opinion shared by poster togtogtog (left), a response by challenger miguelguajiro (top-
right) and a reply by togtogtog indicating successful persuasion with the ∆ symbol (bottom-right). Displayed
above miguelguajiro’s response is their reputation (110∆), which is the number ∆s earned previously.
We use this dataset to analyze whether an individual’s reputation impacts their persuasiveness in
deliberation online, beyond the content of their arguments. Our identification strategy to answer this
question draws on four key components, enabled by several unique characteristics of our dataset:
I. Within-opinion variation: We exploit the availability of multiple challengers of each opinion
to analyze within-opinion variation (via opinion fixed-effects). This controls for unobserved
characteristics of the opinion (such as the topic) and the poster (such as their agreeability) that
may introduce biases arising from users endogenously selecting which opinions to challenge.
II. Approximating persuasive ability: We exploit the availability of multiple persuasion attempts
for each user over time to measure and control for their past (lagged) persuasion rate, as a proxy
for their unobserved persuasive ability (or skill) in each debate.
III. Instrumenting for reputation: We derive an instrument for the reputation of the challenger in
each debate to address potential confounding due to unobserved challenger characteristics that
vary over time, and are hence not controlled for by their past persuasion rate.
IV. Controlling for the response text: Each challenger’s response text is the primary medium
through which their persuasive ability, linguistic fluency and other major determinants of
persuasion are observed by the poster. By controlling for the response text nonparametrically,
we control for and address potential confounding arising from all such determinants.
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We instrument for the challenger’s reputation in each debate with their average position in
the sequence of responses to opinions they challenged previously (their mean past position). For
a given opinion, challengers responding earlier (at lower positions) exhaust the limited space of
good arguments, making it harder for challengers responding later (at higher positions) to persuade
the poster5. Hence, we expect challengers with higher (worse) mean past positions to have lower
reputations in the present, motivating our instrument’s relevance. While users can strategically select
opinions to challenge that have fewer earlier challengers, our instrument remains exogenous after
controlling for the user’s present position in each debate. To further alleviate concerns of instrument
validity, we derive conservative bounds on our estimates with relaxed instrument validity assumptions
using the plausibly-exogenous instrumental variable framework (Conley et al., 2012).
Text plays a key role in ensuring instrument validity. All confounders of the instrument must
affect both the instrument and the debate outcome (whether the poster was persuaded). To affect the
debate outcome, such confounders must operate through channels observable by the poster, the most
prominent of which is the text of the challenger’s response. Hence, “controlling for” the challenger’s
response text blocks the causal pathways between such confounders and the debate outcome, ensuring
that they do not violate instrument validity.
To operationalize this intuition in an ideal world, we would manually annotate, measure and
control for every possible characteristic of the response text that could affect the debate outcome,
which is infeasible at scale. An alternative is to control for a bag-of-words6 (Harris, 1954) vector of
the response text, assuming that functions of this vector capture all text characteristics that determine
the debate outcome. However, the high dimensionality of bag-of-words representations introduces
statistical difficulties that prevent consistent estimation and valid inference.
Dimensionality-reduction techniques are commonly employed to alleviate these difficulties,
whether manually via hand-selected features, or automatically via inverse-regression (Taddy, 2013),
topic-modeling (Blei et al., 2003; Roberts, Stewart, and Airoldi, 2016; Roberts, Stewart, and Nielsen,
2018) and neural text embeddings (Mikolov et al., 2013). However, these techniques provide no
guarantees that the confounders present in the original text are retained in the low-dimensional
text representation, which raises concerns of omitted variable bias. In addition, there is often little
substantive theory to guide the manual feature selection process. Automated dimensionality reduction
techniques, including supervised ones such as feature selection via LASSO (Tibshirani, 1996), could
result in inconsistent estimates due to model misspecification and invalid confidence intervals due to
feature selection uncertainty that is not accounted for in the inference procedure (Belloni et al., 2014).
5This resembles the mechanism of the cable news channel position instrument used to quantify the persuasive power of
Fox News on voting Republican (Martin and Yurukoglu, 2017).
6A bag-of-words representation of a document is a high-dimensional vector of the frequencies of all the words it contains.
Its dimensionality is the size of the vocabulary of words in the document corpus, which is typically of the order of millions.
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We depart from the focus on dimensionality-reduction and instead incorporate the response text as
a control nonparametrically, using recent advances in semiparametric inference with machine learning
models. Specifically, we estimate “nuisance functions” of the response text via machine learning
to predict the debate outcome, challenger reputation and instrument, and partial-out their effects
in the manner of Frisch-Waugh-Lovell (Frisch and Waugh, 1933; Lovell, 1963). This procedure was
introduced as early as (Robinson, 1988) for parametric nuisance functions and recently extended to
nonparametric nuisance functions estimated via machine learning (Chernozhukov et al., 2018; Van
der Laan and Robins, 2003). The recent extensions show that the partialling-out procedure guarantees√
n-consistent and asymptotically normal estimates, as long as each estimated nuisance function
converges to the true nuisance function at the rate of n−1/4 or better.
In particular, we use a recent econometric extension of the partialling-out procedure called double
machine-learning (Chernozhukov et al., 2018) to estimate a partially-linear instrumental variable
specification with text as a control. For our nuisance functions, we use neural networks with rectified
linear unit (ReLU) activation functions (Nair and Hinton, 2010). These neural networks pass the input
text through a series of intermediate layers, each of which learns a latent “representation” that captures
textual semantics at different granularities. The networks are trained via backpropogation (Rumelhart
et al., 1986) with first-order gradient-based techniques (Kingma and Ba, 2015) to minimize classification
or regressions loss functions. Though recurrent (Hochreiter and Schmidhuber, 1997) and convolutional
(Kim, 2014) neural networks are more commonly used for textual prediction tasks, neural networks
with ReLU activation functions come with guaranteed n−1/4 convergence rates (Farrell et al., 2018)
that enable consistent estimation and valid inference in the double machine-learning framework.
Results. We find a significant positive effect of reputation on persuasion. Our instrumental variable
estimates indicate that having 10 additional units of reputation increases the probability of persuading
a poster by 1.09 percentage points. This corresponds to a 31% increase over the platform average
persuasion rate of 3.5%. Since each poster successfully persuaded increases a challenger’s reputa-
tion, the long-run effect of reputation on persuasion is compounded over time. The effect remains
statistically significant across a range of specifications, including ones where the instrument exclusion
restriction is relaxed. Our findings counter the prevailing notion on the ChangeMyView platform that
the persuasive power of reputation can be ignored.
The estimated effect of reputation on persuasion is the local average treatment effect (LATE)
(Imbens and Angrist, 1994) in the population of compliers, comprised of debates where the challenger’s
reputation (the treatment) is affected by their mean past position (the instrument). Such challengers
are less persuasive at higher (later, worse) response positions and more persuasive at lower (earlier,
better) response positions. Hence, we expect debates in the complier population to involve challengers
with moderate to high persuasive ability, since challengers with low persuasive ability are unlikely to
be any more persuasive at any response position.
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To investigate possible mechanisms for this effect, we test the predictions of a theoretical model of
persuasion with information-processing shortcuts called reference cues (Bilancini and Boncinelli, 2018).
We examine how the proportional effects of a challenger’s reputation and skill vary with characteristics
of the opinion and response content. Using the challenger’s response text length as a proxy for the
cognitive complexity of their arguments, we find that the reputation effect share (of the total effect
magnitude of reputation and skill) increases from 82% to 89% from the first to the fourth response
length quantile. This suggests that posters rely more on reputation when the challenger’s arguments
are cognitively complex. This is consistent with the theoretical prediction that individuals will rely
more on low-effort heuristic processing (using reputation as a proxy for the quality of the challenger’s
response) instead of high-effort systematic processing (directly evaluating the challenger’s response)
when subject to greater cognitive overload.
The theoretical model also predicts that individuals will rely less on low-effort heuristic processing
when they are more involved in the issue being debated. We test this prediction using the opinion
text length as a proxy for the issue-involvement of the poster and find that the reputation effect share
decreases from 90% to 83% from the second to the fourth opinion length quantile. This is consistent
with the prediction that more issue-involved posters will rely less on reputation. We find similar
patterns using text complexity measures (such as the Flesch-Kincaid Reading Ease) as proxies for
cognitive complexity and issue-involvement, instead of the response and opinion text length. Overall,
our findings are consistent with reputation serving as a reference cue and used by posters as an
information-processing shortcut under cognitive overload.
We also examine how the effect of reputation on persuasion is moderated by the total number of
opinion challengers. While we expect that having more challengers will increase the cognitive burden
placed on the poster (and hence push them to rely more on heuristic information-processing), we
find no evidence that posters rely more on reputation as the number of opinion challengers increases.
We do find evidence that challengers with higher reputation have longer conversations with posters,
which could be an important mediator of the effect of reputation on persuasion. We also find evidence
that challengers with higher reputation are more likely to attract collaboration from other (non-poster)
users, although reputation continues to have a significant (positive) direct effect on persuasion after
excluding the potential effect of such collaboration.
Contributions and related work. Our research contributes to the economics of persuasion, the
practitioners of which comprise over a quarter of the United States’ GDP (McCloskey and Klamer,
1995), including lawyers, judges, lobbyists, religious workers and salespeople. (Antioch et al., 2013)
revises this number to 30 percent, after including marketing, advertising and political campaigning
professionals. An extensive body of past work on persuasion spans the economics, marketing and
political science literature (among others), and is comprised of both theoretical models (Kamenica, 2018;
Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011) and empirical analyses of the efficacy of persuasive communication
via field or natural experiments (see DellaVigna and Gentzkow, 2010 for a survey).
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Our work differs from previous empirical studies on the economics of persuasion in three ways.
First, previous work focused on identifying the existence of persuasion by quantifying the causal
effect of persuasive communication on some observable behavior, without the ability to observe
individual-level opinion-change. Content and persuader-based moderators of persuasion were then
analyzed conditional on non-zero persuasive effects having been identified (Bertrand et al., 2010;
Landry et al., 2006). In our work, the explicit indicators of persuasion provided by posters allows us to
sidestep the task of identifying persuasion, and directly analyze its determinants. Second, we observe
attempts at persuasion made by thousands of unique individuals, in contrast with previous work.
This enables a broader investigation of the impact of persuader and content characteristics, which
are predicted to play an important role by belief-based persuasion models (Kamenica and Gentzkow,
2011; Mullainathan et al., 2008; Stigler, 1961). Finally, we observe repeated attempts at persuasion
made by each individual that enables approximating and disentangling the impact of their persuasive
ability from other factors.
More specifically, our work informs persuasive information design (Kamenica, 2018) in interactive
settings by quantifying the impact of extraneous signals that could serve as low-effort information-
processing heuristics (Chaiken, 1989; Petty and Cacioppo, 1986; Todorov et al., 2002). Such heuristics
play an increasingly important role in this era of information overload (Jones et al., 2004), as empha-
sized by Cialdini in his seminal book on the principles of influence (Cialdini, 2007):
"Finally, each principle is examined as to its ability to produce a distinct kind of automatic,
mindless compliance from people, that is, a willingness to say yes without thinking first.
The evidence suggests that the ever-accelerating pace and informational crush of modern
life will make this particular form of unthinking compliance more and more prevalent in
the future. It will be increasingly important for the society, therefore, to understand the
how and why of automatic influence."
Interactive persuasion channels are common today, with firms adopting online channels such
as live-chat to triangulate consumers’ beliefs and influence them via dialogue. Interactive channels
are often preferred for defensive marketing tasks (Hauser and Shugan, 1983) such as addressing
complaints and mitigating churn. Some firms invest in interaction further and embed themselves as
bonafide members of influential enthusiast-run online forums7. Marketing communication designed
to persuade in such channels closely resembles the dyadic deliberation we examine in our work.
Our work is also related to research on the impact of certification and reputation systems (Dranove
and Jin, 2010) in markets for labor (Kokkodis and Ipeirotis, 2016; Moreno and Terwiesch, 2014),
knowledge (Dev et al., 2019), and other goods and services (Hui et al., 2016; Lu and Rui, 2018; Tadelis,
2016). Consumers studied in this line of research engage in costly information-processing to evaluate
7A notable examples is gaming giant Electronic Arts (https://www.reddit.com/user/EACommunityTeam/).
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item quality under cognitive, temporal or financial constraints. Hence, the findings therein are
interpreted using the same underlying psychological mechanisms as we employ in our work (Chaiken,
1989; Petty and Cacioppo, 1986). The distinguishing feature of our work is the focus on explicitly
stated opinion-change as the outcome, as a consequence of interpersonal deliberation. Importantly,
there are no monetary transactions involved and the reputation in our setting cannot be purchased at
any cost; it is a truthful proxy for past persuasive ability. Thus, persuasion as exhibited in our setting is
sufficiently different from the purchasing or hiring decisions analyzed in the literature on certification
and reputation systems to warrant separate investigation.
Our work complements studies on deliberation in online settings, such as on political forums
and social media (Nick Beauchamp, 2020; Shugars and Nicholas Beauchamp, 2019). Specifically, our
findings contribute to the understanding of opinion-change and polarization8 online (Quattrociocchi
et al., 2016). By quantifying how an individual’s reliance on heuristic and systematic information-
processing varies with the cognitive complexity of the persuasive message content, our findings could
inform online campaigns that involve persuasive information design aimed at reducing polarization
by affecting opinion-change.
Finally, our work contributes an application to the nascent study of causal inference from text, and
more broadly to the literature on text as data (Gentzkow et al., 2019; Netzer et al., 2019; Toubia et al.,
2019). Our setting involves text as a control (see Keith et al., 2020 for a recent survey of work in this
setting). Previous approaches to accommodate text as a control (though with treatments assumed
to be exogenous) include (Sridhar and Getoor, 2019) which controls for topics in the text, (Roberts,
Stewart, and Nielsen, 2018) which assumes a structural topic model (Roberts, Stewart, and Airoldi,
2016) of text and controls for its sufficient reduction (Taddy, 2013), and (C. Shi et al., 2019; Veitch et al.,
2019) which incorporate neural language models of text in the targeted learning inference framework
(Van der Laan and Rose, 2011).
Our work also links the social science literature on persuasion with the computational natural
language processing literature on argument-mining (Lippi and Torroni, 2016), where online argumen-
tation platforms have been extensively studied (Atkinson et al., 2019; Jo et al., 2018; Luu et al., 2019;
Srinivasan et al., 2019; Tan et al., 2016).
Outline. We begin in Section 2 by introducing background, formalizing our conceptual framework
and motivating our hypotheses. We then describe our dataset in Section 3 and detail our empirical
strategy in Section 4, including a description of our estimation procedure and evidence supporting the
validity of our instrument. We discuss our results in Section 5 and interpret them through the lens of a
theoretical model of persuasion. We conclude by summarizing our findings, discussing managerial
implications for platforms facilitating online deliberation for public and private organizations, and
noting the limitations of our research in Section 6.
8https://www.wsj.com/articles/to-get-along-better-we-need-better-arguments-1531411024
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2 Background and Conceptual Framework
The ChangeMyView online argumentation platform was created in January, 2013 to foster good-faith
discussions on polarizing issues and has received praise for helping combat the proliferation of echo
chambers online9. In this section, we formalize the process of deliberation on ChangeMyView and
describe important platform features to motivate our empirical analyses in Section 4.
Opinion posters, opinion challengers and debates. Our unit of analysis is a debate. Each debate is
associated with an opinion shared by an opinion poster, which is titled with the poster’s primary
claim and contains at least 500 characters of supporting arguments. A response to the opinion by
a challenger initiates a debate between the poster and challenger. Other users can (but rarely) join
the ongoing discussion between a poster and a challenger with their own comments; we term such
debates multi-party. Debates must follow several rules (detailed in Appendix A) enforced by over
20 moderators. Notable rules are: (i) the poster must personally hold a non-neutral opinion, (ii) the
poster must engage with all challengers for at least 3 hours after sharing their opinion, and (iii) a
challenger’s response must counter at least one claim made by the poster. Responses to an opinion are
ordered chronologically and popularity votes on responses are hidden for the first 24 hours after an
opinion is shared. These rules mitigate popularity biases, irrelevant digressions and hostility.
Opinion selection by users. The titles of posted opinions and the identities of the posters who shared
them are displayed in a paginated list on the platform’s homepage, ordered by a combination of
recency and popularity votes10. A tab on the homepage also allows users to order opinions by recency
only. Clicking on an opinion title opens a new page displaying the opinion text and any ongoing or
concluded debates between the poster and other challengers. Users could select opinions to challenge
based on various factors such as the opinion text, their own topical preferences, the poster’s identity,
and the number and status of the debates between the poster and other challengers.
The ∆-system. In mid-February, 2013, ChangeMyView introduced a reputation system called the
∆-system to incentivize challenging opinions on the platform. At any point in a debate, the poster may
reply to the challenger indicating that their opinion has changed using the ∆ symbol or equivalent
alternatives. We term debates where the poster awarded a ∆ to the challenger as successful and
opinions that led to at least one successful debate as conceded. Due to the platform rules requiring
active engagement, 98% of the ∆s from the poster in our dataset were awarded within 24 hours of
the opinion being posted, with over 50% being awarded within just 90 minutes. This short delay
reduces concerns of opinion-change occurring due channels external to the debate. Each awarded
∆ grants the challenger a reputation point. Other non-poster users can (but rarely) also award ∆s to
any challenger and contribute to their reputation. The total reputation points earned previously, if
non-zero, are displayed next to the challenger’s username with all of their responses on the platform.
9“Civil discourse exists in this small corner of the internet” — The Atlantic. December 30, 2018.
10Specifically, in decreasing order of the score: sign(upvotes− downvotes)log
10
|upvotes− downvotes|+ post-datetime/45000.
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The poster’s decision. Consider an opinion p that is challenged by user u. The poster observes u’s
username, reputation rpu and the text of their immediate response to the opinion. Based on this
information, the poster may initiate a discussion with the challenger, elicit additional responses (which
we do not model) and eventually award a ∆ if persuaded to change their opinion. We model the
poster p’s decision to award a ∆ to challenger u as a function of an opinion-specific threshold τp and
the perceived quality q˜pu of u’s response:
Ypu = I[q˜pu > τp] I[x] = 1 if x is true , I[x] = 0 otherwise
q˜pu = αrrpu + αqqpu αr + αq = 1 (1)
Here, Ypu = 1 is the observed debate outcome if the poster awarded a ∆ to u and Ypu = 0 otherwise.
The unobserved threshold τp encodes opinion-specific characteristics such as the opinion topic and
the poster’s openness to persuasion. Based on (Bilancini and Boncinelli, 2018; Dewatripont and
Tirole, 2005), we model the perceived quality q˜pu as a weighted linear combination of the challenger’s
reputation rpu and the “true” response quality qpu, which the poster can determine by evaluating the
challenger’s response at some cognitive cost. Posters choose αr and αq endogenously based on this
cognitive cost and their reliance on heuristic and systematic information-processing (Chaiken, 1989;
Petty and Cacioppo, 1986). If αr > 0, reputation in this model serves as a reference cue: a proxy for the
true response quality that can be processed with lesser effort than evaluating qpu directly.
“True” response quality. We model the true response quality qpu as a function of the user’s “skill”
spu at the time they challenged opinion p and their position tpu in the sequence of challengers of
opinion p. tpu captures the overall impact of previous challengers’ responses. For example, challengers
responding earlier could exhaust the limited space of good arguments, making it harder for later
challengers to respond with arguments of similar quality. We formalize this as follows:
tpu =
∑
u′
I[u′ challenged opinion p before u]
qpu = γsspu + γttpu (2)
We approximate u’s skill by the Laplace-smoothed (Manning et al., 2008) fraction of posters persuaded
before opinion p, where p is chronologically-ordered and Sp′u = 1 if u challenged opinion p′:
spu =
∑
p′<p Yp′uSp′u + 2sµ∑
p′<p Sp′u + 2
(3)
Here, sµ is a “prior” set to the empirical persuasion probability of users in their first debate (≈ 1.6%).
Smoothing ensures that the skill of users measured when they have challenged few opinions tends to
sµ instead of to 0. A user’s skill is thus their (smoothed) lagged persuasion rate, which captures all
user characteristics that affect persuasion and do not change with the their tenure on the platform.
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Hypotheses. Based on prior analytical work (Bilancini and Boncinelli, 2018), we test three comple-
mentary hypotheses on the weights αr and αq, which reflect the poster’s endogenously-determined
reliance on heuristic and systematic information-processing respectively:
H1. Reputation has persuasive power, αr > 0.
H2. The relative persuasive power of reputation, αrαr+αq , increases as the cognitive
cost of processing the challenger’s response increases.
H3. The relative persuasive power of reputation, αrαr+αq , decreases as the involve-
ment of the poster in the debated issue increases.
Confirming (H1) indicates that reputation has persuasive power, and confirming (H2) and (H3) lends
support to the mechanism proposed by the model of (Bilancini and Boncinelli, 2018).
3 Data
We collect all the discussions on the ChangeMyView platform between January, 2013 and October,
2019 using a combination of the official Reddit API11 and the third-party PushShift API (Baumgartner
et al., 2020), in full compliance with their terms of service. We exclude submissions to ChangeMyView
that are not opinions using the fact that opinion titles are required to be prefixed with “CMV:”. The
excluded submissions encompass discussions about the platform, announcements of platform changes
and celebrations of milestones. We also exclude the opinions and responses posted to ChangeMyView
before the reputation system became fully functional on March 1, 2013.
Figure 2: Reputation and skill
We extract indicators of successful persuasion from the debate text
using the same extraction rules employed by ChangeMyView to
programmatically parse ∆s and other alternative symbols12. We use
the extracted indicators to label debate success, to reconstruct each
challenger’s reputation and to measure each challenger’s skill in each
debate. Figure 2 shows the empirical variation in skill with reputation
in our dataset, with each point indicating the reputation and skill
for each challenger measured in a single debate, colored based on
the number of debates they participated in previously. At values of
skill outside the low and high extremes, there is a wide variation
in the reputation (r = 0.29, p < 0.001). This variation is essential to
disentangle the effects of reputation and skill on persuasion.
11https://www.reddit.com/dev/api/
12Code obtained from: https://github.com/alexames/DeltaBot
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Debates by challengers who had deleted their ChangeMyView accounts before data collection
appear in our dataset with the “[deleted]” placeholder username. The inability to link the debates by
such challengers over time makes it impossible to measure their true reputation and skill. Assuming
that such challengers have zero reputation and skill sµ (based on equation 3) is likely to attenuate our
estimates due to measurement error. Hence, we exclude all 118,277 such debates from our dataset13.
Our final dataset contains 91,730 opinions (23.5% of them conceded) shared by 60,573 unique posters,
which led to 1,026,201 debates (3.5% of them successful) with 143,891 unique challengers. Table 1
reports descriptive statistics of our dataset, and Figure 3 reports user-level distributions of participation
and debate success. Table 2 summarizes the notation that will use in all subsequent sections.
Mean Standard Deviation Median
Statistics of challengers in each debate
Reputation rpu 15.9 43.4 1.0
Skill spu (%) 3.0 3.7 1.6
Position tpu 14.8 24.3 8.0
Mean past position Zpu 10.4 13.0 7.5
Number of past debates
∑
p′<p Sp′u 244.4 591.7 24.00
Statistics of overall dataset
Number of opinions 91,730
Opinions conceded 21,576
Opinions leading to more than 1 debate 84,998 (number of clusters with opinion fixed-effects)
Number of debates 1,026,201
Successful debates 36,187
Multi-party debates 348,041
Number of debates per opinion 11.2 12.7 9
Successful debates per opinion 0.4 0.9 0
Number of unique posters 60,573
Opinions per poster 1.5 2.4 1
Number of unique challengers 143,891
Challengers with more than 1 debate 64,871 (number of clusters with user fixed-effects)
Number of debates per challenger 7.1 58.5 1
Successful debates per challenger 0.3 3.2 0
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics. Debates from March 1, 2013 to October 10, 2019.
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Figure 3: Debate participation and success. Distribution of total and successful debates per user.
13For completeness, we also report our main results including debates with deleted challengers in Appendix C.
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Symbol
p Chronological opinion index
u Chronological response index
pu Tuple representing a debate: the uth response to opinion p
τp Opinion fixed-effect; captures unobserved opinion characteristics
ρu Challenger fixed-effect; captures unobserved challenger characteristics
rpu Reputation of the challenger in debate pu; sum of the past ∆s earned
spu Skill of the challenger in debate pu; smoothed lagged persuasion rate
tpu Position of the challenger in debate pu
mpu Calendar month-year fixed-effect for debate pu
Xpu Vector representation of the text of the challenger’s immediate response in debate pu
Ypu Binary outcome of debate pu; Ypu = 1 for successful debates, Ypu = 0 otherwise
Spu Binary opinion selection indicator; Spu = 1 if u challenged opinion p, Spu = 0 otherwise
Zpu Instrument (mean past position) for the challenger’s reputation in debate pu
Table 2: Summary of notation. List of recurring symbols introduced in Sections 2 and 4.
4 Empirical Strategy
4.1 Baseline Specifications
Equations (1) and (2) motivate baseline specifications that relate the observed debate outcome Ypu to
the challenger’s reputation rpu, skill spu and position tpu as follows (constants omitted for brevity):
Y ∗pu = τp + β1rpu + β2spu + β3tpu + pu E[pu|τp, rpu, spu, tpu] = 0
Ypu = I[Y ∗pu > 0]
Here, τp is an opinion fixed-effect and pu is an error term with zero conditional mean. Since the
fixed-effects are at the opinion level and skill (a function of lagged dependent variables) is at the user
level, these are not dynamic panel specifications, and are hence unaffected by Nickell bias (Nickell,
1981). Including the opinion fixed-effects excludes 6,732 debates from the sample, which were the only
responses to their respective opinions. If distributional assumptions (such as Gumbel or Gaussian)
on pu hold and there are no unobserved confounders, the estimate of β1 quantifies the change in the
probability of persuading the poster of opinion p upon increasing the challenger’s reputation by one
unit, with all else equal. In Section 5, we report estimates from logistic and linear probability models.
While the assumption of no unobserved confounding is restrictive (and relaxed in Section 4.2),
the baseline specifications address two important sources of confounding. First, controlling for the
challenger’s skill controls for all challenger characteristics that affect persuasion (such as their rhetorical
ability and linguistic fluency) and that do not vary with their tenure on ChangeMyView. To see why
such characteristics confound the effect of reputation on persuasion, note that a user’s reputation
largely depends on the number of posters persuaded previously: rpu ≈
∑
p′<p Yp′u (since users who are
not posters rarely award ∆s). Hence, any unobserved challenger characteristic that affects the outcome
of every debate Ypu, Y(p−1)u, Y(p−2)u, . . . will also affect their reputation rpu ≈ Y(p−1)u + Y(p−2)u + . . . ,
and thus confound the effect of reputation rpu on the debate outcome Ypu.
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Dependent Variable: Debate Success Ypu
No. of opinions challenged previously
∑
p′<p Sp′u −1× 10−6 (0.7× 10−6)
Position tpu (std. deviations) −0.0107 (0.0003)∗∗∗
User fixed-effects (ρu) 3
Month-year fixed-effects (mpu) 3
No. of debates 947, 181
R2 0.07
Note: Standard errors displayed in parentheses. ∗∗∗p < 0.001;∗∗ p < 0.01;∗ p < 0.05
Table 3: Estimated effect of past experience on debate success.
However, skill does not capture challenger characteristics that vary with their tenure on Change-
MyView. By assuming the absence of such characteristics, the baseline specifications implicitly assume
that users do not learn to be more persuasive with experience on the platform. We provide empirical
evidence to support this assumption by estimating the following linear probability model:
Ypu = ρu +mpu + θ1
∑
p′<p
Sp′u + θ2tpu + pu
where ρu is a user fixed-effect capturing all unobserved time-invariant user characteristics, mpu is
a calendar month-year fixed-effect capturing unobserved temporal factors, tpu is the (standardized)
user’s position in the sequence of challengers of opinion p and pu is a Gaussian error term.
∑
p′<p Sp′u
is the number of opinions that u challenged previously, serving as a measure of their past experience.
θ1 is the within-user correlation between past experience and the debate outcome. If users improve
with experience, we expect θ1 to be positive. However, the estimates of θ1 reported in Table 3 are
small and statistically insignificant. We attribute this to users having already acquired argumentation
experience outside the platform, with little to gain from additional experience on the platform.
Second, controlling for the opinion fixed-effect τp addresses confounding due to users endoge-
nously selecting which opinions to challenge. To see why opinion selection is a concern, recall the
opinion selection indicator Spu that equals 1 when user u challenges opinion p. Since we estimate our
specifications on observed debates, our specifications implicitly condition on Spu = 1. If the opinion
selection probability P[Spu = 1] is correlated with (i) reputation, and (ii) debate success (for example,
if users prefer to challenge opinions on topics that are easier to persuade in), the effect of reputation
on debate success will be confounded due to endogenous sample selection (Heckman, 1979).
We characterize this confounding using the causal graph in Figure 4 based on the analyses in
(Hernán et al., 2004). In causal graphs (Pearl, 2009), an edge A → B implies that A may or may not
cause B, while the absence of an edge implies the stronger assumption that A does not cause B. An
undirected edge↔ implies potential causality in either direction. Observed variables are shaded and
unobserved variables are unshaded.
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rpu Ypu
UpSpu
Figure 4: Opinion selection causal graph.
Dependent Variable: I[u challenges > 1 future opinion]
Reputation rpu (10 units) 0.0177 (0.0001)∗∗∗
User fixed-effects (ρu) 3
Month-year fixed-effects (mpu) 3
No. of debates 947, 181
R2 0.56
Note: Standard errors displayed in parentheses.
∗∗∗p < 0.001;∗∗ p < 0.01;∗ p < 0.05
Table 4: Reputation/opinion selection correlation.
The shaded nodes rpu, Ypu and Spu correspond to the reputation, debate outcome and opinion
selection indicator respectively. The unshaded node Up is any unobserved opinion characteristic that
could directly affect both opinion selection and debate success, such as the opinion topic.
In the causal graph in Figure 4, Spu is a collider. A collider is any node C that is a common outcome
in causal substructures of the form X → C ← Y . Conditioning on C opens a causal pathway between
X and Y that would otherwise be blocked. If reputation is correlated with opinion selection (depicted
by the undirected edge rpu ↔ Spu), conditioning on the collider Spu (which our specifications do
implicitly) opens the confounding causal pathway Up → Spu ↔ rpu. This confounds the effect of
reputation on the debate outcome, since Up now affects both Ypu and rpu (via Spu).
We test for correlation between rpu and Spu by estimating the following linear probability model of
a user challenging more than one opinion after opinion p:
I[u challenges > 1 future opinion] = ρu +mpu + θ1rpu + pu
where ρu is a user fixed-effect, mpu is a calendar month-year fixed-effect and pu is a Gaussian error
term. The estimate of θ1 in Table 4 suggests a significant positive correlation between rpu and Spu.
This correlation may arise either because users that were successful in the past (and hence have higher
reputation) are more likely to challenge opinions in the future, or because more active users are likely
to have higher reputation (a mechanical relationship). Fortunately, the opinion fixed-effect τp controls
for all opinion characteristics, including the unobserved Up, thus addressing potential confounding.
In summary, our baseline specifications address potential confounding due to (i) time-invariant
challenger characteristics that affect persuasion, and (ii) users endogenously selecting which opinions
to challenge. In the next section, we introduce specifications that instrument for the challenger’s
reputation in each debate. The instrumental variable specifications inherit the robustness of the
baseline specifications to confounding from time-invariant challenger characteristics and endogenous
opinion selection, while further addressing potential confounding due to time-varying challenger
characteristics that affect debate success.
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4.2 Instrumental Variable Specifications
Our instrumental variable specifications address confounding due to unobserved user characteristics
that affect persuasion and vary with their experience on the platform. Estimates from this specification
quantify the local average treatment effect (LATE) of reputation on debate success if instrument
relevance, exogeneity, exclusion and monotonicity hold (Imbens and Angrist, 1994). In this section,
we derive our instrument and provide empirical evidence to support its validity.
Our instrument is motivated by the fact that a user’s reputation largely depends on the number of
posters persuaded previously, since other users who are not the poster rarely award ∆s:
rpu ≈
∑
p′<p
Yp′u
From equation (2), we also know that a user’s position tpu in the sequence of challengers of opinion
p is correlated with debate success Ypu. Hence, we define our instrument Zpu for the challenger’s
reputation rpu as the mean past position of user u before challenging opinion p:
Zpu =
∑
p′<p tp′uSp′u∑
p′<p Sp′u
(4)
where p′ is a chronologically-ordered opinion index, and the opinion selection indicator Sp′u = 1 if
user u challenged opinion p′ and Sp′u = 0 otherwise. We expect users who were consistently late
challengers of opinions in the past (and thus, have larger mean past positions) to have persuaded
fewer posters on average than users who were consistently early, and hence have lower reputation in
the present. Thus, we expect Zpu to be negatively correlated with rpu.
We confirm this relationship with the following first-stage regression:
rpu = τp + a1Zpu + a2spu + a3tpu + pu (5)
where τp is an opinion fixed-effect, spu is user u’s skill, tpu is user u’s position in the sequence of
challengers of opinion p and pu is a zero-mean Gaussian error term.
Our first-stage estimates in Table 5 indicate that a one unit increase in the mean past position of a
user predicts a 0.18 unit decrease in their present reputation. The F-statistic on the instrument greatly
exceeds the rule-of-thumb threshold (Stock and Yogo, 2005), alleviating concerns about instrument
strength. Skill has a positive first-stage correlation with reputation, which is expected since higher
skilled users are likely to have persuaded more posters previously. The response position has a
negative first-stage correlation with reputation, which we expect if users are consistent in their
preference to respond early or late.
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Dependent Variable: Reputation rpu
Mean past position Zpu −0.1833 (0.003)∗∗∗
Skill spu (percentage) 2.3055 (0.012)∗∗∗
Position tpu (std. deviations) −1.7354 (0.067)∗∗∗
Opinion fixed-effects (τp) 3
Instrument F-Statistic 3, 338.7
No. of debates 1, 019, 469
R2 0.22
Note: Standard errors displayed in parentheses. ∗∗∗p < 0.001;∗∗ p < 0.01;∗ p < 0.05
Table 5: First-stage estimates. Mean past position as an instrument for reputation.
An immediate concern is users selecting opinions to challenge based on their anticipated position in
the sequence of challengers, since users can observe the number of ongoing and concluded debates
with the poster before deciding to challenge an opinion. We characterize this scenario using the
causal graph in Figure 5, which extends the causal graph in Figure 4 with shaded nodes Zpu (for the
instrument) and tpu (for the challenger’s present position). tpu affects the debate outcome Ypu, based on
equation (2). Recall from Section 4.1 that our specifications implicitly condition on the collider Spu = 1.
If the instrument is correlated with opinion selection (depicted by the undirected edge Zpu ↔ Spu) and
users select opinions to challenge based on their anticipated position (depicted by the edge tpu → Spu),
conditioning on Spu will open the confounding causal pathway tpu → Spu ↔ Zpu. Hence, it is essential
to control for the challenger’s present position tpu, which could otherwise confound the instrument.
The causal graph in Figure 5 reveals a second source of instrument confounding that has received
recent attention (Hughes et al., 2019; Swanson, 2019). If the instrument is correlated with opinion
selection (depicted by the undirected edge Zpu ↔ Spu) and some unobserved opinion characteristic
Up (such as the opinion topic) affects both opinion selection and debate success, conditioning on Spu
opens the confounding causal pathway Up → Spu ↔ Zpu that violates instrument exogeneity.
We can test for correlation between the instrument and opinion selection by estimating the following
linear probability model of a user challenging more than one opinion after opinion p, where ρu is a
user fixed-effect, mpu is a calendar month-year fixed-effect and pu is a Gaussian error term:
I[u challenges > 1 future opinion] = ρu +mpu + θ1Zpu + θ2rpu + pu
The estimates of θ1 in Table 6 suggest a small but significant negative correlation between Zpu and Spu,
justifying our concerns of endogenous opinion selection violating instrument exogeneity. Fortunately
(as discussed Section 4.1), the opinion fixed-effect τp controls for all opinion characteristics, including
unobserved Up. This alleviates concerns of instrument exogeneity being violated due to endogenous
opinion selection.
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Ypurpu
UpSpu
tpu
Zpu
Figure 5: Instrument confounding via opinion selection.
Dependent Variable: I[u challenges > 1 future opinion]
Mean past position Zpu −0.0040 (0.00003)∗∗∗
Reputation rpu (10 units) 0.0166 (0.00012)∗∗∗
User fixed-effects (ρu) 3
Month-year fixed-effects (mpu) 3
No. of debates 947, 181
R2 0.57
Note: Standard errors displayed in parentheses.
∗∗∗p < 0.001;∗∗ p < 0.01;∗ p < 0.05
Table 6: Instrument/opinion selection correlation.
Another plausible concern is of the instrument affecting the debate outcome via channels that do
not include the user’s reputation, which violates the instrument exclusion restriction. For example, if
users learn to be more persuasive from the earlier challengers of an opinion, a user with a high mean
past position could be more persuasive in the present than one with a low mean past position.
rpu
Zpu
Ypu
V
a
b
c
d
Xpu
We address this concern in two ways. First, note that any user
characteristic correlated with successful persuasion is likely to affect the
debate outcome through the text of their responses. Hence, controlling
for the response text will block direct channels of influence between
the instrument and the debate outcome. This is formalized by the
causal graph on the right. Here, the reputation rpu, debate outcome
Ypu, response text Xpu and instrument Zpu are observed. V contains all
unobserved confounders of the instrument or reputation (or both) that
affect the outcome through the text Xpu. If we decompose the text into
conceptual components a, b, c and d, it is sufficient to control for a to
block the Zpu ↔ V → a → Ypu causal pathway.
We operationalize this idea by estimating the following partially-linear instrumental variable specifica-
tion with endogenous rpu, as formulated by (Chernozhukov et al., 2018):
Ypu = β1rpu + β2spu + β3tpu + g(τp, Xpu) + pu E[pu|Zpu, τp, spu, tpu, Xpu] = 0
Zpu = α1spu + α2tpu + h(τp, Xpu) + 
′
pu E[′pu|τp, spu, tpu, Xpu] = 0
In this specification, the high-dimensional covariates τp (the opinion fixed-effects) and Xpu (a vector
representation of u’s response text) have been moved into the arguments of the “nuisance functions”
g(·) and h(·). As earlier, rpu is u’s reputation, spu is u’s skill, tpu is u’s position and Zpu (the instrument)
is the mean past position of u before opinion p. pu and ′pu are error terms with zero conditional mean.
β1 is the parameter of interest, quantifying the causal effect of reputation on persuasion.
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No distributional assumptions are placed on pu and ′pu, and hence, this specification does not
assume any functional form (in contrast with logit, probit and linear probability models). g(·) and h(·)
can be flexible nonparametric functions. We discuss estimation and inference in Section 4.3.
Second, we use the “plausibly exogenous” instrumental variable framework (Conley et al., 2012)
to relax the instrument exclusion restriction and include Zpu directly in the debate outcome model14:
Ypu = τp + β1rpu + β2spu + β3tpu + γZpu + pu E[pu|Zpu, τp, spu, tpu] = 0
Zpu = τp + α1spu + α2tpu + 
′
pu E[′pu|τp, spu, tpu] = 0
where γ 6= 0 encodes by how much the exclusion restriction is violated. For a fixed γ and conditionally
exogenous instrument, the effect of reputation on debate success can be quantified via two-stage
least-squares estimation of the following regression, using Zpu as an instrument for rpu:
(Ypu − γZpu) = τp + β1rpu + β2spu + β3tpu + pu
If users indeed learn to be more persuasive from earlier challengers, we would expect γ > 0. We
report estimates of β1 from the specification above for a range of γ values in Section 5.
While instrument relevance, exogeneity and exclusion are sufficient to guarantee identification
of the effect of reputation on debate success, we also require instrument monotonicity to interpret
our estimate as a local average treatment effect (LATE) (Imbens and Angrist, 1994). Instrument
monotonicity will be violated if there exists a subpopulation of debates where increasing the mean
past position of the challenger would increase their present reputation, and decreasing their mean past
position would decrease their present reputation (members of this subpopulation are called defiers).
Such challengers are more likely to persuade a poster when they respond later. The large and precisely-
estimated negative within-user correlation between the number of earlier challengers and debate
success (θˆ2 = −0.0107± 0.0003) in Table 3 suggests that the existence of such challengers is unlikely.
The LATE is the effect of reputation on debate success for compliers, comprised of debates where
the challenger’s reputation is indeed affected by their mean past position. The challengers in these
debate subpopulations are more persuasive at earlier (lower) positions, and less persuasive at later
(higher) positions. Hence, we expect that the compliers exclude debates with challengers having
low persuasive ability, who are unlikely to be more or less persuasive in any position. We also
expect challengers with moderate to high persuasive ability to benefit more from an increase in their
reputation than challengers with low persuasive ability, since a high reputation is unlikely to substitute
for low persuasive ability. Hence, we expect the LATE to be larger than the average treatment effect of
reputation on debate success.
14(Conley et al., 2012) proposes four inference strategies that incorporate plausibly exogenous instruments. The inference
strategy we use relies on the fewest assumptions and provides the most conservative estimates of β1.
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4.3 Estimation and Inference
Our baseline linear probability model and linear instrumental variable specifications can be estimated
using ordinary least-squares and two-stage least squares respectively, adapted to accommodate high-
dimensional fixed-effects (Correia, 2016). In this section, we describe how the double machine-learning
framework (Chernozhukov et al., 2018) can be used to consistently estimate the effects of reputation,
skill and position in the partially-linear instrumental variable specification.
Double machine-learning extends the partialling-out procedure of Frisch-Waugh-Lovell (Frisch
and Waugh, 1933; Lovell, 1963) to use flexible nonparametric functions estimated via machine learning.
We first describe the basic setup assuming reputation is conditionally exogenous (given the response
text), ignoring the opinion fixed-effects, and ignoring the effects of skill and position. Consider the
following partially-linear probability model:
Ypu = βrpu + g(Xpu) + pu E[pu|rpu, Xpu] = 0
rpu = h(Xpu) + 
′
pu E[′pu|Xpu] = 0
where Ypu is the debate outcome, rpu is the challenger’s reputation, Xpu is their response text and pu
and ′pu are Gaussian error terms with zero conditional mean. g(·) and h(·) are unknown nonparametric
functions. We are interested in consistently estimating and performing valid inference on β.
If g(·) and h(·) were fixed and known, consistent estimation is possible by solving for β in an
empirical version of the following moment condition (equivalent to ordinary least-squares estimation):
E[(Ypu − g(Xpu)− βrpu)rpu] = 0
However, g(·) is unknown and needs to be jointly estimated with β. A solution is to first estimate
g(·) on a separate subsample S ′ of the data, and then estimate β by solving an empirical version of
the moment condition above on the remaining subsample S. This procedure, called sample-splitting,
eliminates the “overfitting-bias” introduced in the process of estimating g(·).
If g(·) is estimated via machine learning, the procedure above results in inconsistent estimates βˆ.
(Chernozhukov et al., 2018) decomposes the scaled bias of βˆ into the following two terms:
√
n(βˆ − β) = ( 1
n
∑
(p,u)∈S
r2pu)
−1 1√
n
∑
(p,u)∈S
rpupu︸ ︷︷ ︸
Term a
+ (
1
n
∑
(p,u)∈S
r2pu)
−1 1√
n
∑
(p,u)∈S
rpu(g(Xpu)− gˆ(Xpu))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Term b
Term a converges at a n−1/2 rate to a zero-mean Gaussian. However, by virtue of g(·) being estimated
via machine learning, term b will typically converge to zero at a rate slower than n−1/2 due to the slow
convergence of the estimation error g(Xpu)− gˆ(Xpu). This is called the “regularization bias” of gˆ(·).
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Double machine-learning eliminates regularization bias via a procedure called orthogonalization. β
is estimated by solving an empirical version of the following “Neyman-orthogonal” moment condition:
E[((Ypu − E[Ypu|Xpu])− β(rpu − E[rpu|Xpu]))(rpu − E[rpu|Xpu])] = 0
The empirical version of this moment condition can be solved via a procedure similar to the residual-
on-residuals regression of (Robinson, 1988). The procedure is as follows (where S and S ′ are disjoint
subsamples of the data, and m(·) and l(·) are nonparametric functions):
1. Estimate the conditional expectation function l(Xpu) = E[Ypu|Xpu] on S ′ to get lˆ(·).
2. Estimate the conditional expectation function m(Xpu) = E[rpu|Xpu] on S ′ to get mˆ(·).
3. Estimate the outcome residual Y˜pu = Ypu − lˆ(Xpu) on S.
4. Estimate the treatment residual r˜pu = rpu − mˆ(Xpu) on S.
5. Regress Y˜pu on r˜pu to obtain βˆ.
Note that we no longer need to estimate g(·), and instead need to estimate the conditional expectations
l(·) and m(·) that can be arbitrary nonparametric functions of Xpu (such as neural networks). This
procedure can be extended to include skill and position as controls by estimating additional conditional
expectation functions to predict the challenger’s skill and position from their response text on S′,
estimating the residuals s˜pu and t˜pu on S, and then regressing Y˜pu on r˜pu, s˜pu and t˜pu.
The resulting estimate βˆ is
√
n-consistent and asymptotically normal. (Chernozhukov et al., 2018)
shows that term b of the scaled bias of βˆ is now given by following expression:
(
1
n
∑
(p,u)∈S
V 2pu)
−1 1√
n
∑
(p,u)∈S
(m(Xpu)− mˆ(Xpu))︸ ︷︷ ︸
mˆ(·)estimation error
(l(Xpu)− lˆ(Xpu))︸ ︷︷ ︸
lˆ(·)estimation error
This contains the product of nuisance function estimation errors. Hence, orthogonalization enables√
n-consistent estimation of βˆ as long as the product of the convergence rates of mˆ(·) and lˆ(·) is n−1/2.
This is more viable than requiring each nuisance function to converge at a n−1/2 rate.
If rpu is endogenous and Zpu is a valid instrument for rpu, (Chernozhukov et al., 2018) proposes
the following Neyman-orthogonal moment condition to estimate β in a partially-linear instrumental
variable specification:
E[((Ypu − E[Ypu|Xpu])− β(rpu − E[rpu|Xpu]))(Zpu − E[Zpu|Xpu])] = 0 (6)
By a similar bias derivation, the estimated βˆ is shown to be
√
n-consistent and asymptotically normal,
as long as the instrument is valid and the product of the nuisance function convergence rates is n−1/2.
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We now detail our overall estimation procedure for the partially-linear instrumental variable
specification. We include the opinion fixed-effect τp, skill spu and position tpu as controls. S and S ′ are
disjoint subsamples of the data, andmr(·),ms(·),mt(·),mp(·), l(·) and q(·) are nonparametric functions
that we detail in the next subsection. The procedure is as follows:
1. Estimate the following conditional expectation functions on sample S ′:
i. l(Xpu, τp) = E[Ypu|Xpu, τp] to get lˆ(·).
ii. q(Xpu, τp) = E[Zpu|Xpu, τp] to get qˆ(·).
iii. mr(Xpu, τp) = E[rpu|Xpu, τp] to get mˆr(·).
iv. ms(Xpu, τp) = E[spu|Xpu, τp] to get mˆs(·).
v. mt(Xpu, τp) = E[tpu|Xpu, τp] to get mˆt(·).
2. Estimate the following residuals on sample S:
i. Y˜pu = Ypu − lˆ(Xpu, τp).
ii. Z˜pu = Zpu − qˆ(Xpu, τp).
iii. r˜pu = rpu − mˆr(Xpu, τp).
iv. s˜pu = spu − mˆs(Xpu, τp).
v. t˜pu = tpu − mˆt(Xpu, τp).
3. Run a two-stage least-squares regression of Y˜pu on r˜pu, s˜pu, t˜pu using Z˜pu as an instrument for
r˜pu to obtain the estimated local average treatment effects of reputation, skill and position on
debate success.
We partition the debates for opinions with more than one response (mirroring the data used in
the specifications with opinion fixed-effects) uniformly at random into an estimation subsample S′
containing 10% of the debates (101,946 debates) and an inference subsample S containing 90% of the
debates (917,523 debates), ensuring that every opinion is represented in both S and S′. In the next
section, we describe how we use neural networks with rectified linear unit (ReLU) activation functions
for the nonparametric functions mr(·),ms(·),mt(·),mp(·), l(·) and q(·), which have been shown to
converge at n−1/4 rates (Farrell et al., 2018) that enables consistent estimation and valid inference.
4.4 Neural Models of Text as Nuisance Functions
A fully-connected neural network with h hidden layers is parameterized by matricesW 1, . . . ,W h+1
and activation functions (called activations) a1, . . . , ah+1. The hidden layer sizes s1, . . . , sh are architec-
tural hyperparameters that determine the sizes of the matricesW 1, . . . ,W h+1 as follows, where D and
O are the dimensionalities of the neural network input and output, respectively:
Size ofW 1 = D × s1
Size ofW i = si−1 × si for i = 2, . . . , h
Size ofW h+1 = sh ×O
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[Xpu, τp] ∈ ℝ1×D R1 ∈ ℝ1×s1
W2 ∈ ℝs1×1 a2( ⋅ )
̂rpu ∈ ℤ+
̂Ypu ∈ {0,1}
̂spu ∈ [0,100]
̂tpu ∈ ℝ
Input Output Layer Predicted Output
W1 ∈ ℝD×s1 a1( ⋅ )
Hidden Layer
̂Zpu ∈ ℝ+
Figure 6: A neural network with one hidden layer (h = 1). The neural network transforms the D-dimensional
input, a concatenation of the response text vector Xpu and the fixed-effects indicator vector for τp, into a
1-dimensional output. W 1 andW 2 are parameters to be estimated. a1(·) and a2(·) are activation functions.
Each layer i multiplies the intermediate vector Ri−1 produced by the previous layer withW i, and
applies the activation function ai(·) to produce Ri = ai(Ri−1W i). Figure 6 illustrates a neural network
with one hidden layer (h = 1), input dimensionality D and output dimensionality O = 1. The neural
network transforms the input, a concatenation of the response text vector Xpu and the fixed-effects
indicator vector for τp, into the 1-dimensional predicted output a2(a1([Xpu, τp]×W 1)×W 2).
We estimate five neural networks with rectified linear unit (ReLU) activations to predict (i) debate
success Ypu ∈ {0, 1}, (ii) reputation rpu ∈ Z+, (iii) skill spu ∈ [0, 100] (as a percentage), (iv) position
tpu ∈ R (standardized to have zero-mean and unit-variance) and (v) the instrument Zpu ∈ R+ from
the response text Xpu and opinion fixed-effects τp. Though recurrent (Hochreiter and Schmidhuber,
1997) and convolutional (Kim, 2014) neural networks are more popular for textual prediction tasks,
ReLU neural networks have guaranteed n−1/4 convergence rates (Farrell et al., 2018) that we require
for consistent estimation and valid inference. Hence, we set each of the hidden layer activations
a1(·), . . . , ah(·) to the rectifier function ai(x) = max(0, x). Since the output of each neural network is
one-dimensional, we set the size of the output layer matrixW h+1 to sh × 1.
Output layer activations and loss functions. For the debate success prediction network with the
binary target Ypu ∈ {0, 1}, we set the output layer activation to the logistic sigmoid function: ah+1(x) =
(1 + e−x)−1 ∈ [0, 1]. For the skill prediction network with the bounded target spu ∈ [0, 100], we set the
output layer activation to the scaled logistic sigmoid function: ah+1(x) = (1 + e−x)−1 × 100 ∈ [0, 100].
For the reputation and instrument prediction networks with nonnegative targets rpu ∈ Z+ and
Zpu ∈ R+, we set the output layer activation to the rectifier function: ah+1(x) = max(0, x). For the
position prediction network with unbounded target tpu ∈ R, we set the output layer activation to
the identity function: ah+1(x) = x. We estimate the parametersW 1, . . . ,W h+1 for the debate success
prediction network by minimizing the binary cross-entropy loss Ypulog(Yˆpu) + (1− Ypu)log(1− Yˆpu)
(where Yˆpu is the predicted output), and for the other networks by minimizing the mean squared error.
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Neural network input. We follow recommendations from the text-as-data literature (Gentzkow et al.,
2019) and construct a term-frequency inverse-document-frequency (TF-IDF) matrix from the text of the
challengers’ responses. We preprocess the text to remove links, numbers, pronouns, punctuation and
text formatting symbols, and replace each word with its lower-cased stem (for example, “economically”
and “economics” will be replaced by the stem “economic”). We exclude very rare words (present in
less than 0.1% of the responses) and very frequent words (present in more than 99.9% of the responses),
since these words will contribute negligibly towards more accurate predictions. The final vocabulary
contains 4,926 distinct words. Each row of the TF-IDF matrix corresponds to a vector Xpu ∈ R4926.
We also construct an indicator vector τp ∈ {0, 1}84998 (since there are 84,998 unique opinion clusters),
where only the pth element of τp is set to 1 and the rest are set to zero. The concatenation of these two
vectors, [Xpu, τp] ∈ R89924, is passed as input to the neural networks.
Optimization. We train each network via backpropagation (Rumelhart et al., 1986) with the Adam
gradient-based optimization algorithm (Kingma and Ba, 2015) iterating over mini-batches of the
training data. We begin the optimization process by initializing the parameters using the Kaiming
uniform initialization scheme (He et al., 2015), which has been shown to perform well both empirically
and theoretically (Hanin and Rolnick, 2018). We perform batch-normalization (Ioffe and Szegedy,
2015) on each layer’s output after applying the activation function to prevent internal covariate
shift and accelerate convergence. To prevent overfitting to the training data, we apply weight-decay
(a form of L2-norm penalization) (Krogh and Hertz, 1992) to all the parameters, along with early-
stopping (halting the training process once the out-of-sample predictive power starts decreasing with
training iterations). We do not employ dropout regularization (Srivastava et al., 2014), since it reduces
out-of-sample predictive power when combined with batch-normalization (Li et al., 2019).
Architectural and optimization hyperparameters. The number of hidden layers h, hidden layer sizes
s1, . . . , sh, weight-decay penalty, optimization learning rate and mini-batch size are architectural
and optimization hyperparameters that need to be tuned empirically. Hence, we further partition
the debates in the estimation subsample S′ uniformly at random into a training subsample S′train
containing 75% of the debates (76,459 debates) and a validation subsample S′val containing 25% of the
debates (25,487 debates). During the hyperparameter tuning process, we train the neural network on
S′train and evaluate its loss at each training iteration on both S
′
train and S
′
val.
We fix the size of the hidden layers s1, . . . , sh to the dimensionality of the response text vector Xpu
(=4,926) and tune the number of hidden layers for each neural network. Deep, fixed-width ReLU
networks of this type have been shown to generalize well both empirically and theoretically (Hanin,
2019; Safran and Shamir, 2017). For each neural network, we evaluate the training loss (for at most
5,000 mini-batch iterations with early-stopping) with an increasing number of hidden layers, until
the training loss no longer improves. Each neural network with the number of hidden layers thus
found has enough representational capacity to capture patterns in the training data, but is likely to
have overfit the training data and suffer from poor out-of-sample predictive power.
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Number of Activation Functions
Prediction target Hidden layers Hidden Layer Output Layer Loss Function
Debate success Ypu ∈ {0, 1} 5 ReLU Sigmoid Binary Cross-Entropy
Reputation rpu ∈ Z+ 3 ReLU Rectifier Mean squared error
Skill spu ∈ [0, 100] (percentage) 3 ReLU Sigmoid Mean squared error
Position tpu ∈ R (standardized) 3 ReLU Identity Mean squared error
Instrument Zpu ∈ R+ 5 ReLU Rectifier Mean squared error
Table 7: Architectural hyperparameters. The input layer matrix W 1 of each neural network has size 89,924
× 4,926, where 89,924 is the dimensionality of the input vector (the vocabulary size + the number of unique
opinion clusters) and 4,926 is the dimensionality of Xpu (the vocabulary size). Each of the h hidden layer
matricesW 2, . . .W h has size 4,926 × 4,926, and the output layer matrixW h+1 has size 4,926 × 1.
Subsample Loss
Prediction target Learning Rate Batch Size Weight-Decay Train Validation Inference
Debate success Ypu ∈ {0, 1} 0.0001 50,000 10000 0.148 0.155 0.152
Reputation rpu ∈ Z+ 0.0001 50,000 10 39.801 40.406 39.842
Skill spu ∈ [0, 100] (percentage) 0.0001 50,000 10 3.672 3.764 3.707
Position tpu ∈ R (standardized) 0.0001 50,000 10 0.658 0.789 0.796
Instrument Zpu ∈ R+ 0.0001 50,000 10000 12.389 13.370 13.217
Table 8: Optimization hyperparameters. The subsample losses on S′train, S
′
val and S are reported after training
each neural network with the selected hyperparameters for at most 5,000 mini-batch iterations (with early-
stopping) on S′train. The binary cross-entropy subsample loss is reported for the network predicting Ypu and the
root mean squared prediction error is reported for the other networks.
Hence, after having selected the number of hidden layers for each neural network via the aforemen-
tioned procedure, we evaluate the validation loss of each neural network (for at most 5,000 mini-batch
iterations with early-stopping) with an increasingly large weight-decay penalty (in the logarithmically-
spaced range 0.001, 0.01, 0.1, . . . ), until the validation loss no longer improves. The final neural
network thus found will have sufficient representational capacity and be sufficiently regularized to
generalize well out-of-sample. During the process of tuning the number of hidden layers and the
weight-decay penalty, we also empirically evaluate and select the values of the learning rate and
mini-batch size that deliver the minimum validation loss with fast and stable convergence.
Table 7 summarizes the selected architectural hyperparameters. Table 8 summarizes the selected
optimization hyperparameters and the losses on each data subsample, which reflect the extent to
which each target is correlated with potential confounders present in response text. After fixing the
selected hyperparameters, we re-estimate the neural networks with on the full estimation subsample
S′, estimate the prediction residuals on the inference sample S and run a two-stage least-squares
regression with these residuals, as described in the double machine-learning procedure in Section 4.3.
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5 Results
Dependent Variable: Debate Success Ypu
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Reputation rpu (10 units) 0.0006∗∗∗ 0.0010∗∗∗ 0.0014∗∗∗ 0.0109∗∗∗ 0.0091∗∗∗
(0.00003) (0.00006) (0.00006) (0.00059) (0.00079)
Skill spu (percentage) 0.0024∗∗∗ 0.0040∗∗∗ 0.0035∗∗∗ 0.0012∗∗∗ 0.0016∗∗∗
(0.00004) (0.00007) (0.00007) (0.00016) (0.00024)
Position tpu (std. deviations) −0.0479∗∗∗ −0.0093∗∗∗ −0.0097∗∗∗ −0.0078∗∗∗ −0.0088∗∗∗
(0.00265) (0.00078) (0.00087) (0.00075) (0.00077)
Response text (Xpu) 7 7 7 7 3
Instrument (Zpu) 7 7 7 3 3
Opinion fixed-effects (τp) 7 7 3 3 3
No. of debates 1, 026, 201 1, 026, 201 1, 019, 469 1, 019, 469 1, 019, 469
R2 0.051 0.012 0.203 — —
Note: Standard errors (clustered by opinion) displayed in parentheses. ∗∗∗p < 0.001;∗∗ p < 0.01;∗ p < 0.05
Table 9: Main results. Estimated effects of reputation, skill and position on debate success with a logit model
without opinion fixed-effects (1), linear probability models without (2) and with (3) opinion fixed-effects, linear
instrumental variable (4) and partially-linear instrumental variable (5) specifications. Position is standardized to
have zero-mean and unit-variance. Average marginal effects and pseudo-R2 are reported for the logit model.
The instrument Zpu is the mean past position of user u before they challenged opinion p.
Table 9 reports the estimated (marginal) effects of reputation, skill and position on debate success.
We exclude opinion fixed-effects from the logit model to prevent dropping debates for opinions where
none of the challengers persuaded the poster, which is required to estimate conditional logit models
(Chamberlain, 1980). For all specifications, we find that the effects are precisely estimated, statistically
significant and have the expected signs. The estimates from the baseline specifications in columns
(1) — (3) indicate that a challenger having 10 additional units of reputation is 0.06 — 0.14 percentage
points more likely to persuade a poster on average, than another challenger of the same opinion with
all else equal. This corresponds to a 1.7 — 4.0% increase over the platform average debate success rate
of 3.5%. Keeping in mind the difficulty of persuasion (the average persuasion rate of a user in our
dataset is 0.6%, and the median persuasion rate of a user is 0.0%), this increase is significant.
Three additional observations are worth noting. First, we expect the estimated effect of skill to be
attenuated due to measurement error in all specifications. Second, comparing columns (2) and (3), we
find that including the opinion-fixed effects increases the estimated effect of reputation. This suggests
that endogenous opinion selection (discussed in Section 4.1) biases the estimated effect of reputation
downwards. Second, the estimated effect of reputation is an average across all challengers, including
those with low (and high) persuasive ability who are unlikely to benefit from additional reputation.
We expect the impact of reputation to be higher for challengers with moderate persuasive ability.
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The estimated effects from the baseline specifications in columns (1) — (3) of Table 9 may be
confounded by unobserved time-varying challenger characteristics (discussed in Section 4.2). Hence,
we use the challenger’s mean past position as an instrument for their reputation, and report the
estimated local average treatment effects (LATEs) of reputation, skill and position on debate success
with a linear instrumental variable specification in column (4). The estimates indicate that a challenger
having 10 additional units of reputation is 1.09 percentage points more likely on average to persuade
a poster, than another challenger of the same opinion with all else equal. This corresponds to a 31%
increase over the platform average debate success rate of 3.5%. Compared to the linear probability
model estimates, the estimated LATE of reputation is 7.8 times larger. We attribute this increase to
the compliers (debate subpopulations where the challenger’s reputation is indeed affected by the
instrument) having challengers with moderate to high persuasive ability, who benefit more from an
increase in their reputation than those with low persuasive ability.
The instrument exclusion restriction will be violated if the mean response position of a challenger
in the past has a direct effect on their probability of success in the present debate. This is possible if,
for example, users become more persuasive by learning from the earlier responders to the opinions
they challenged previously (as discussed in Section 4.2). However, the persuasive ability acquired in
this manner is likely to affect debate success through the text of the challenger’s responses. Hence,
we alleviate concerns of instrument exclusion being violated by controlling for the response text in
a partially-linear instrumental variable specification, and report the estimated LATEs in column (5)
of Table 9. The estimated LATEs from this specification are less precise and differ slightly from the
estimates in column (4), but are statistically indistinguishable at the 5% level (using a two-tailed Z-test).
This suggests that the instrument exclusion restriction is not violated by factors present in the text.
We supplement these results by reporting LATE estimates using the plausibly-exogenous method-
ology (Conley et al., 2012), which assumes a known direct effect γ of the instrument on debate success,
for a range of γ in Table 10. If users become more persuasive by learning from earlier challengers,
we expect γ > 0. Table 10 indicates that the estimated reputation LATE after correcting for exclusion
restriction violations of this type is larger, in which case our linear instrumental variable specification
(without this correction) under-estimates the true LATE. For γ = −0.0002, the estimated LATE of rep-
utation after correcting for the exclusion restriction violation becomes insignificant. This is expected,
since correcting for γ = −0.0002 completely eliminates the “reduced form” effect of the instrument
on debate success (reported in Appendix D). Setting the “reduced form” effect of the instrument on
the outcome to zero as such necessarily renders the estimated treatment effect insignificant (Angrist
and Krueger, 2001). For γ < −0.0002, the estimated LATE of reputation after correcting for exclusion
restriction violations is negative, which is intuitively implausible.
In summary, our main results confirm hypothesis H1 (Section 2): that reputation has persuasive
power on the ChangeMyView platform. In the rest of this section, we investigate potential mechanisms
that could explain the persuasive power of reputation.
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Dependent Variable: Debate Success Ypu
Exclusion violation (γ) −0.0004 −0.0002 −0.0001 +0.0001 +0.0002 +0.0004
Reputation rpu (10 units) −0.0110∗∗∗ −0.0001 0.0054∗∗∗ 0.0163∗∗∗ 0.0218∗∗∗ 0.0327∗∗∗
(0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0008)
Skill spu (percentage) 0.0062∗∗∗ 0.0037∗∗∗ 0.0025∗∗∗ −0.0001 −0.0013∗∗∗ −0.0038∗∗∗
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Position tpu (std. deviations) −0.0116∗∗∗ −0.0097∗∗∗ −0.0087∗∗∗ −0.0069∗∗∗ −0.0059∗∗∗ −0.0040∗∗∗
(0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0006)
Response text (Xpu) 7 7 7 7 7 7
Instrument (Zpu) 3 3 3 3 3 3
Opinion fixed-effects (τp) 3 3 3 3 3 3
No. of debates 1, 109, 469 1, 109, 469 1, 109, 469 1, 109, 469 1, 109, 469 1, 109, 469
Note: Standard errors (clustered by opinion) displayed in parentheses. ∗∗∗p < 0.001;∗∗ p < 0.01;∗ p < 0.05
Table 10: Results with a plausibly-exogenous instrument. Estimated effects of reputation, skill and position
with a linear instrumental variable specification and plausibly-exogenous instrument. All specifications include
opinion fixed-effects. Position is standardized to have zero-mean and unit-variance. The instrument Zpu is the
mean past position of user u before they challenged opinion p.
Motivated by a theoretical model of persuasion with reference cues (Bilancini and Boncinelli, 2018),
we investigate whether reputation serves as a reference cue (an information-processing shortcut) for
the challenger’s response quality by examining patterns in the heterogeneity of the effects of reputation
and skill with the content of the debate. These patterns reflect how the poster’s usage of heuristic
and systematic information-processing (Chaiken, 1989) varies with content characteristics that affect
information-processing effort. The model predicts that individuals rely more on low-effort heuristic
processing than on high-effort systematic processing when subject to greater cognitive overload. In
our setting, this translates to posters relying more on a challenger’s reputation than on their skill when
the challenger’s response is more cognitively complex (hypothesis H2 in Section 2). The model also
predicts that individuals rely less on heuristic processing than on systematic processing when they are
more involved in the issue being debated (hypothesis H3 in Section 2).
We test both predictions by examining how the relative estimated effects of reputation and skill
on debate success vary with the cognitive complexity of the challenger’s response and with the
issue-involvement of the poster. Using the length (in characters) of the challenger’s response text and
of the poster’s opinion text as proxies for cognitive complexity and issue-involvement, respectively,
Table 11 reports LATE estimates of the effects of reputation and skill interacted with the response
and opinion length (binned into quantiles). Note that the specifications in Table 11 do not include
opinion fixed-effects, which would absorb all variation in the opinion length. They include calendar
month-year fixed-effects, since unobserved temporal variation is no longer accounted for without the
opinion fixed-effects.
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The estimated LATEs in columns (1) and (2) of Table 11 quantify how the effects of reputation and
skill (separately) vary with the response length, which serves as a proxy for the cognitive complexity
of the challenger’s response. The effects of both reputation and skill increase with the response length.
This is expected since, with longer responses, the content explains more of the debate outcome than
other factors. However, the effect of reputation increases more than that of skill from the first to the
fourth response length quantile: by +0.0133 for reputation compared to +0.0030 for skill. Measuring
the share of the effect magnitude of reputation (of the sum of effect magnitudes of reputation and
skill) at each response length quantile reveals that the reputation effect share increases from 82% to
89%. This is consistent with the poster’s increased reliance on reputation as a heuristic shortcut and
decreased reliance on systematic evaluation of argument quality. This pattern supports hypothesis H2.
The estimates in columns (3) and (4) quantify how the effects of reputation and skill vary with
the opinion length, where we assume that longer opinions are correlated with the poster being more
involved in the issue being debated. The effect of reputation remains largely the same after the second
opinion length quantile, while that of of skill increases significantly in each subsequent opinion length
quantile. The share of the effect magnitude of reputation (of the sum of effect magnitudes of reputation
and skill) decreases from 90% to 83% from the second to the fourth opinion length quantile. This
is consistent with the decreased reliance of the poster on reputation as a heuristic shortcut and the
increased reliance on systematic evaluation of argument quality as the issue-involvement of the poster
increases. This pattern supports hypothesis H3.
Similar trends are observed if reading complexity measures (such as the Flesch-Kincaid Reading
Ease) are used to proxy for the cognitive complexity of the challenger’s response and the issue-
involvement of the poster. The negative estimated effects of skill for opinions and responses in the first
length quantile could be attributed to higher skilled users preferring to write longer responses and to
challenge longer opinions. These preferences are a form of endogenous selection on the interaction
terms, and will bias our estimates downwards. Since we only examine trends in the estimated effects,
and do not interpret their absolute values, these biases are not a major concern.
We now examine if reputation serves as a way for cognitively-overloaded posters to select chal-
lengers to engage with. Table 12 reports the LATE estimates of reputation interacted with the total
number of challengers of the opinion, binned into quantiles. The specification in Table 12 does not
include opinion fixed-effects, since they absorb all variation in the number of challengers, but includes
calendar month-year fixed-effects and the response and opinion length as controls. We expect that,
under the larger cognitive burden of having to respond to more challengers, posters would rely on
reputation as a filtering heuristic. However, the estimates in Table 12 indicate a decrease in the effect
of reputation as the number of opinion challengers increases, which likely reflects the preference of
reputed users for challenging opinions with fewer existing challengers. Hence, we find no support for
the hypothesis that posters use reputation to select challengers to engage with.
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Dependent Variable: Debate Success Ypu
Moderator Mpu Response Text Length Opinion Text Length
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Reputation rpu (10 units) 0.0093∗∗∗ 0.0085∗∗∗
(0.0005) (0.0005)
× I[Mpu ∈ 1st quantile] 0.0038∗∗∗ −0.0007
(0.0006) (0.0006)
× I[Mpu ∈ 2nd quantile] 0.0066∗∗∗ 0.0114∗∗∗
(0.0006) (0.0007)
× I[Mpu ∈ 3rd quantile] 0.0088∗∗∗ 0.0117∗∗∗
(0.0006) (0.0007)
× I[Mpu ∈ 4th quantile] 0.0171∗∗∗ 0.0126∗∗∗
(0.0010) (0.0008)
Skill spu (percentage) 0.0005∗∗∗ 0.0009∗∗∗
(0.0002) (0.0001)
× I[Mpu ∈ 1st quantile] −0.0008∗∗∗ −0.0021∗∗∗
(0.0002) (0.0002)
× I[Mpu ∈ 2nd quantile] −0.0002 0.0012∗∗∗
(0.0002) (0.0002)
× I[Mpu ∈ 3rd quantile] 0.0001 0.0018∗∗∗
(0.0002) (0.0002)
× I[Mpu ∈ 4th quantile] 0.0022∗∗∗ 0.0025∗∗∗
(0.0002) (0.0002)
Position tpu (std. deviations) −0.0074∗∗∗ −0.0071∗∗∗ −0.0071∗∗∗ −0.0071∗∗∗
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008)
Response Length (characters)
I[∈ 1st quantile]
I[∈ 2nd quantile] 0.0035∗∗∗ 0.0046∗∗∗ 0.0072∗∗∗ 0.0060∗∗∗
(0.0009) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004)
I[∈ 3rd quantile] 0.0080∗∗∗ 0.0119∗∗∗ 0.0157∗∗∗ 0.0143∗∗∗
(0.0010) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0005)
I[∈ 4th quantile] 0.0218∗∗∗ 0.0306∗∗∗ 0.0395∗∗∗ 0.0396∗∗∗
(0.0013) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0006)
Opinion Length (characters)
I[∈ 1st quantile]
I[∈ 2nd quantile] 0.0257∗∗∗ 0.0262∗∗∗ 0.0036∗ 0.0153∗∗∗
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0014) (0.0008)
I[∈ 3rd quantile] 0.0284∗∗∗ 0.0289∗∗∗ 0.0054∗∗∗ 0.0161∗∗∗
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0014) (0.0008)
I[∈ 4th quantile] 0.0309∗∗∗ 0.0316∗∗∗ 0.0068∗∗∗ 0.0167∗∗∗
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0016) (0.0008)
Response text (Xpu) 7 7 7 7
Instrument (Zpu) 3 3 3 3
Opinion fixed-effects (τp) 7 7 7 7
Month-year fixed-effects 3 3 3 3
No. of debates 1, 026, 201 1, 026, 201 1, 026, 201 1, 026, 201
Note: Standard errors (clustered by opinion) displayed in parentheses. ∗∗∗p < 0.001;∗∗ p < 0.01;∗ p < 0.05
Table 11: Heterogeneity with response and opinion length. Variation in the estimated LATEs of reputation,
skill and position on debate success with response and opinion length (binned into quantiles).
Dependent Variable: Debate Success Ypu
Reputation rpu (10 units)
× I[Number of opinion challengers ∈ 1st quantile] 0.0086∗∗∗
(0.0008)
× I[Number of opinion challengers ∈ 2nd quantile] 0.0082∗∗∗
(0.0007)
× I[Number of opinion challengers ∈ 3rd quantile] 0.0067∗∗∗
(0.0006)
× I[Number of opinion challengers ∈ 4th quantile] 0.0044∗∗∗
(0.0012)
Skill spu (percentage) 0.0009∗∗∗
(0.0001)
Position tpu (std. deviations) −0.0055∗∗∗
(0.0008)
Number of opinion-challengers
I[∈ 1st quantile]
I[∈ 2nd quantile] −0.0101∗∗∗
(0.0021)
I[∈ 3rd quantile] −0.0178∗∗∗
(0.0019)
I[∈ 4th quantile] −0.0144∗∗∗
(0.0022)
Response Length (characters)
I[∈ 1st quantile]
I[∈ 2nd quantile] 0.0061∗∗∗
(0.0004)
I[∈ 3rd quantile] 0.0145∗∗∗
(0.0005)
I[∈ 4th quantile] 0.0401∗∗∗
(0.0006)
Opinion Length (characters)
I[∈ 1st quantile]
I[∈ 2nd quantile] 0.0271∗∗∗
(0.0008)
I[∈ 3rd quantile] 0.0298∗∗∗
(0.0008)
I[∈ 4th quantile] 0.0324∗∗∗
(0.0008)
Response text (Xpu) 7
Instrument (Zpu) 3
Opinion fixed-effects (τp) 7
Month-year fixed-effects 3
No. of debates 1, 026, 201
Note: Standard errors (clustered by opinion) displayed in parentheses. ∗∗∗p < 0.001;∗∗ p < 0.01;∗ p < 0.05
Table 12: Heterogeneity with the number of opinion challengers. Variation in the estimated LATEs of reputa-
tion, skill and position with the number of opinion challengers (binned into quantiles).
Dependent Variable: Conversation Tree Length
(1) (2) (3)
Reputation rpu (10 units) 0.8537∗∗∗ 0.8499∗∗∗ 0.3661∗∗
(0.025) (0.025) (0.138)
Skill spu (percentage) −0.1123∗∗∗ −0.1184∗∗∗ −0.0273
(0.005) (0.005) (0.027)
Position tpu (std. deviations) −1.2354∗∗∗ −1.1888∗∗∗ −2.6737∗∗∗
(0.103) (0.100) (0.511)
Conditional on debate success Ypu
Unsuccessful debates (Ypu = 0) 7 3 7
Successful debates (Ypu = 1) 7 7 3
Response text (Xpu) 7 7 7
Instrument (Zpu) 3 3 3
Opinion fixed-effects (τp) 3 3 3
No. of debates 1, 109, 469 982, 867 23, 157
Note: Standard errors (clustered by opinion) displayed in parentheses. ∗∗∗p < 0.001;∗∗ p < 0.01;∗ p < 0.05
Table 13: Conversation tree length as the outcome. Estimated effects of reputation, skill and position on the
conversation tree length with the linear instrumental variable specification. All specifications include opinion
fixed-effects. Position is standardized to have zero-mean and unit-variance. The instrument Zpu is the mean
past position of user u before they challenged opinion p.
We also examine if having higher reputation leads to longer conversations with the challenger,
which could mediate the effect of reputation on debate success. We estimate the effect of reputation
on the conversation tree length: the maximum number of turns of dialogue in the conversation tree
initiated by the challenger’s response. It equals 1 if no one responds to the challenger, and is greater
than 1 otherwise. It is positively (but weakly) correlated with debate success (r = 0.13, p < 0.001).
Table 13 reports the estimated LATEs of reputation, skill and position on the conversation tree
length. The estimates in column (1) indicate that having 10 additional units of reputation leads to
conversations trees that are 0.85 turns longer on average,with all else equal. Since the poster must
use one turn of dialogue when awarding a ∆ to the challenger, this estimate may simply reflect the
direct effect of reputation on persuading the poster. Hence, columns (2) and (3) report the estimated
LATEs separately for unsuccessful and successful debates, and find that having 10 additional units of
reputation leads to conversations trees that are 0.85 turns longer on average even for unsuccessful
debates. Hence, it is plausible that reputation affects debate success via longer conversations.
The estimated LATEs also indicate that an additional percentage point of skill leads to conversation
trees that are up to 0.11 turns shorter on average for both unsuccessful and successful debates. This
suggests that higher skilled challengers are either quicker to abandon futile conversations, or are able
to persuade the poster in fewer turns of dialogue.
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Dependent Variable I[ Debate pu is multi-party ] Debate Success Ypu
(1) (2)
Reputation rpu (10 units) 0.1093∗∗∗ 0.0062∗∗∗
(0.0034) (0.0006)
Skill spu (percentage) −0.0167∗∗∗ 0.0010∗∗∗
(0.0007) (0.0002)
Position tpu (std. deviations) −0.1781∗∗∗ −0.0021∗∗∗
(0.0148) (0.0003)
Only single-party debates 7 3
Response text (Xpu) 7 7
Instrument (Zpu) 3 3
Opinion fixed-effects (τp) 3 3
No. of debates 1, 109, 468 667, 678
Note: Standard errors (clustered by opinion) displayed in parentheses. ∗∗∗p < 0.001;∗∗ p < 0.01;∗ p < 0.05
Table 14: Single-party vs. multi-party debates. Estimated effects of reputation, skill and position on whether
a debate is multi-party in column (1), and on debate success for single-party debates only in column (2),
with a linear instrumental variable specification. All specifications include opinion fixed-effects. Position is
standardized to have zero-mean and unit-variance. The instrument Zpu is the mean past position of user u
before they challenged opinion p.
Finally, we examine the effect of reputation on attracting collaboration from other users. Recall
from Section 3 that other (non-poster) users may join an ongoing debate between the challenger and
poster; we term such debates multi-party. 6.1% of multi-party debates are successful, as compared to
2.4% of non-multi-party debates, indicating a positive association between debate success and whether
the debate is multi-party. If this association is causal, part of the effect of reputation on debate success
may be due to attracting collaboration from other users. The estimated LATEs in column (1) of Table
14 indicate that having 10 additional units of reputation increases the probability of the debate being
multi-party by 11%. The mechanism via which higher reputation challengers attract other users to
join their debates may be complex. For example, higher reputation challengers may engage in longer
conversations that make it easier for other users to join.
To exclude the effect of reputation that is potentially due to attracting collaboration from other
users, we report the estimated LATEs of reputation, skill and position on debate success for single-
party debates only in column (2) of Table 14. The estimates share the same sign as the overall LATEs
reported in Table 9, with smaller magnitudes. This could be due to single-party debates occurring on
less popular topics, which are more difficult to persuade in, and hence less likely to attract users who
may collaborate with the challengers in ongoing debates. Nevertheless, reputation continues to have a
significant positive effect on debate success after excluding the potential effect of collaboration from
other non-poster users.
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6 Conclusion
Using a 7-year panel of over a million debates from a large online argumentation platform containing
explicit indicators of successful persuasion, we quantify the persuasive power of ethos — one of the
three modes of persuasion described in Aristotle’s Rhetoric — in deliberation online. Specifically, we
identify the causal effect of the reputation of an opinion challenger on persuading a poster on the
ChangeMyView platform, using the mean position of the challenger in past debates as an instrument
for their present reputation. We address endogenous opinion selection using opinion fixed-effects,
and ensure instrument validity by controlling for the text of the challenger’s response using neural
models of text in a partially-linear instrumental variable specification.
We find a statistically significant positive effect of reputation on debate success, with 10 additional
units of reputation increasing the probability of persuading the poster by 31% over the mean platform
persuasion rate of 3.5%. The relative effect of the challenger’s reputation with respect to their skill
increases with the cognitive complexity of their response (proxied for by the length of their response
text), and decreases with the issue-involvement of the poster (proxied for by the length of the opinion
text), confirming the predictions of a theoretical model of persuasion where reputation serves as a
reference cue (Bilancini and Boncinelli, 2018). We find no evidence that posters use reputation as
a way to select which challengers to engage with, but we do find evidence that reputation induces
longer conversations with the challenger. While we find evidence that reputation attracts collaboration
with the challenger from other users (which may in turn affect persuasion), the estimated effect of
reputation continues to be positive and statistically significant after excluding debates where such
collaboration occurred. These findings suggest that reputation serves as a proxy for argument quality
and validity, and is used by cognitively-overloaded posters as a low-effort information-processing
heuristic to evaluate a challenger’s arguments.
Our findings have implications for a variety of platforms that facilitate deliberative decision-
making online, including the Stanford Online Deliberation Platform15 used by government organiza-
tions to elicit public opinion, and Github used by technology firms engaged in remote collaborative
software development (Marlow et al., 2013). Specifically, our results suggest that if the participants
in deliberation sessions can observe characteristics of other participants, such as past organizational
contributions or awards, such characteristics may serve as reference-cues that endow “reputed” par-
ticipants with additional persuasive power. As a consequence, the degree of consensus within each
deliberation session could increase, while distorting the average consensus opinions over a sequence
of deliberation sessions towards those held by reputed participants. Such an outcome is undesirable
in practice, and violates one of the key tenets of authentic deliberation (Fishkin and Luskin, 2005). In
general, our findings may be of interest to online platforms that employ reputation systems and are
concerned about their unintended effects (Chen, 2018; Z. Shi et al., 2020).
15https://stanforddeliberate.org/
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The reference-cue mechanism (Bilancini and Boncinelli, 2018) supported by our findings reveals
three possible managerial strategies to address this inequity. Importantly, these strategies do not rely
on simply hiding all reputation indicators, since employees may desire to showcase their reputation
for several justifiable reasons without having any intention to exploit its persuasive power. Visible
indicators of reputation are also potent motivators, and hiding them completely could nullify their
ability to incentivize engagement. Instead, organizations can increase the effort required to view
participants’ reputation by displaying it less prominently, albeit at the cost of reducing the motivational
power of reputation. Alternatively, firms can simplify the language of participants’ arguments to
reduce their information-processing costs (with machine learning tools like Grammarly, for example),
thus reducing the need for participants to rely on low-effort heuristics. This, however, comes at the cost
of disrupting participants’ natural communication styles. Finally, firms can manipulate the perceived
accuracy of reputation as an information-processing shortcut by using ambiguous reputation displays
(using colors instead of numbers, for example). In contrast with the previous strategies, this strategy
is simple to implement and unlikely to have negative repercussions.
Our findings also have implications for organizations directly engaged in online persuasion via
dialogue, for purposes as varied as sales, addressing customer complaints (Hauser and Shugan,
1983; Ma et al., 2015), and reducing societal polarization. Since individuals online are often under
information-overload, they are likely to rely on heuristic signals when faced with a persuasive message.
Hence, low-reputation organizations (such as new entrants in a market, or organizations having a less
favorable reputation among certain demographics) could benefit from simplifying their messages to
induce less cognitive overload. Alternatively, organizations could benefit from acquiring reputation
signals that are perceived as a proxy for their quality. However, it is important to determine which
reputation signals would be perceived as accurate proxies by the organizations’ target demographic
and require relatively low effort to evaluate.
The ChangeMyView argumentation platform we study provides us a rich source of online conver-
sations containing explicit indicators of persuasion. The large scale, long timeframe and high quality
of the textual data enable identifying and examining causal mechanisms that would be impossible
outside of laboratory settings. However, this comes at the cost of generalizing to other online (and
offline) settings. The heavily moderated, good-faith discussions on this platform are different from
the typical conversations on social media platforms like Facebook and Twitter, that are dominated
by hostility and groupthink. Hence, our estimates could be viewed as upper bounds on the effects
of reputation and skill on persuasion, and should be validated by future research into situations
were successful persuasion is considered near-impossible or completely independent of the message
content. Likewise, additional investigation is needed to study the effect of reputation on conversations
offline, where a host of other factors (such as physical appearances and the environmental setting) are
likely to affect successful persuasion.
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Appendix A: Platform Rules
Rules for shared opinions:
• Rule A: Explain the reasoning behind your view (500+ characters required).
• Rule B: You must personally hold the view and demonstrate that you are open to it changing.
• Rule C: Submission titles must adequately sum up your view.
• Rule D: Posts cannot express a neutral stance, suggest harm against a specific person, or be
self-promotional.
• Rule E: Only post if you are willing to have a conversation with those who reply to you, and are
available to do so within 3 hours after posting.
An opinion may also be removed if it violates any of the following:
1. It was posted by a brand new account on a highly controversial topic.
2. The user already has an active opinion from the last 24 hours. This is to encourage posters to
stay engaged with their posts and continue discussion.
3. It’s identical in principle to another post made within 24 hours before it.
4. Anything that is clearly spam or posted by a bot/novelty account.
Opinions will never be removed based on topic or content, so long as they follow the rules above.
Rules for responses to opinions:
• Rule 1: Direct responses to a submission must challenge or question at least one aspect of the
submitted view.
• Rule 2: Don’t be rude or hostile to other users.
• Rule 3: Refrain from accusing the poster or anyone else of being unwilling to change their view.
• Rule 4: Award a delta when acknowledging a change in your view, and not for any other reason.
• Rule 5: Responses must contribute meaningfully to the conversation.
A response may also be removed if it violates any of the following:
1. It is a deliberate attempt to disrupt discussion.
2. Anything that is clearly spam or posted by a bot/novelty account.
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Appendix B: Correlation Table
All correlations are significant at p < 0.001.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(1) Reputation 1.00 — — — —
(2) Skill 0.29 1.00 — — —
(3) Position -0.11 -0.14 1.00 — —
(4) Mean past position -0.11 -0.14 0.22 1.00 —
(5) Number of past debates 0.88 0.16 -0.12 -0.10 1.00
Appendix C: Results Including Debates by Deleted Challengers
Dependent Variable: Debate Success Ypu
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Reputation rpu (10 units) 0.0007∗∗∗ 0.0011∗∗∗ 0.0015∗∗∗ 0.0068∗∗∗
(0.00003) (0.00006) (0.00006) (0.00081)
Skill spu (percentage) 0.0024∗∗∗ 0.0042∗∗∗ 0.0036∗∗∗ 0.0023∗∗∗
(0.00004) (0.00007) (0.00007) (0.00021)
Position tpu (std. deviations) −0.0446∗∗∗ −0.0085∗∗∗ −0.0087∗∗∗ −0.0078∗∗∗
(0.00246) (0.00069) (0.00077) (0.00074)
Response text (Xpu) 7 7 7 7
Instrument (Zpu) 7 7 7 3
Opinion fixed-effects (τp) 7 7 3 3
No. of debates 1, 144, 478 1, 144, 478 1, 137, 968 1, 137, 968
R2 0.054 0.013 0.192 —
Note: Standard errors (clustered by opinion) displayed in parentheses. ∗∗∗p < 0.001;∗∗ p < 0.01;∗ p < 0.05
Table 15: Main results. Estimated effects of reputation, skill and position on debate success with a logit model
without opinion fixed-effects (1), linear probability models without (2) and with (3) opinion fixed-effects, linear
instrumental variable (4) specifications. Position is standardized to have zero-mean and unit-variance. Average
marginal effects and pseudo-R2 are reported for the logit model. The instrument Zpu is the mean past position
of user u before they challenged opinion p.
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Appendix D: Instrumental Variable Specification Reduced-Form
Dependent Variable: Reputation Ypu
Mean past position Zpu −0.0002 (0.00001)∗∗∗
Skill spu (percentage) 0.0037 (0.00007)∗∗∗
Position tpu (std. deviations) −0.0097 (0.00086)∗∗∗
Opinion fixed-effects (τp) 3
No. of debates 1, 019, 469
R2 0.20
Note: Standard errors displayed in parentheses. ∗∗∗p < 0.001;∗∗ p < 0.01;∗ p < 0.05
Table 16: Reduced-form estimates. Mean past position as an instrument for reputation.
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